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“Going once…going twice…[bang].
Sold to the agent on LAN124.56.”
Our agent just bought the suit of
medieval armor we had been searching
for and paid for it with the proceeds
from the sale of our antique radio. The
agent had been monitoring several
online auctions and began bidding
when the armor became available. Our
agent’s winning bid quickly brought to
a close an intense bidding war among
42 agents scattered across the country.
All it has left to do is contact a shipping agent to have the armor delivered.
Auctions can involve not only consumers, but also businesses. An auction might be an ideal way for a business to sell excess inventory. Auctions
can form dynamically and enable the
exchange of goods much as stock
exchanges manage the buying and
selling of securities. But because auctions have a wide scope and a short
lifetime, the opportunistic behavior
needed for successful interaction
requires agents to both participate in
and manage auctions.
Types of Auctions
Over the years many types of auctions
have been developed to satisfy different requirements. The most familiar
is the first-price, open-cry auction,
also known as the English auction.
The auctioneer asks for progressively
higher bids and closes when no one is
willing to exceed the current bid. The
winning buyer (highest bidder) then
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pays the amount bid to the seller in
return for the item. Typically, the auctioneer receives a small percentage of
the sell price.
Other types of auctions include the
first-price, sealed-bid auction, where
each buyer submits only one bid in a
sealed envelope; the second-price,
sealed-bid (Vickrey) auction, where
the buyer pays the second-highest bid
price; and the Dutch auction, where
the price descends from a sufficiently
high number until someone states a
desire to buy at the current price.
First-price, open-cry auctions are
often preferred because sellers are not
required to reveal their true valuations. Buyers, however, are encouraged to speculate about each other’s
reservation price. Dutch auctions can
conclude more quickly by lowering
the price at a faster rate, but they also
encourage speculation. In a secondprice, sealed-bid auction, the buyers’
best strategy is to bid (and thereby
reveal) their true valuation. They
must also trust the auctioneer to
reveal the correct second price.
Each auction type has advantages,
depending on the values placed on
buyer/seller privacy, time to closing,
avoidance of speculation, fairness of
the final sale price, and so on. Most
current Internet auctions, such as
eBay and OnSale, use the English
auction, since their primary goal is
entertainment, delivered in the form
of buyer speculation.

AGENTS ON THE WEB

ONLINE AUCTIONS

A Bid for Position
Users employing search engines to
locate relevant Web sites don’t always
realize that those appearing at the top
of the resulting list may have purchased this prominent position. At
GoTo.com, content providers bid to
be listed earlier (first) on search lists.
If one bids 6 cents a hit to be listed
first, it stays in that position until
another bids 7 cents a hit. Providers
pay their bid amount each time someone uses their link.
AltaVista is also arranging for
providers to bid for placement on the
search results that it returns. If you’re
a consultant on the Y2K problem and
you’d like to be listed first when a user
searches on the keyword “Y2K,” then
you would try to be the highest bidder for this keyword. At AltaVista the
minimum bid is 25 cents, and you
would pay this every time a search
result listed you near the top.
Right now, list preference auctions
are held just once, and no software
agents are involved. This makes it difficult for new businesses to get listed
in favorable positions. In the future,
however, the bidding might occur
much more frequently, with providers
essentially bidding for top position on
each user’s search request. Such an
arrangement would require agents to
both manage the bidding and represent each of the bidders.
User Agents at the Ready
Because online auctions can occur at
any time, our agents must be alert to
the appearance of items that we might
wish to buy. They need to know not
only our interests, but also the value
we attach to items and how much we
would be willing to pay or what we
would be willing to trade.
The Tete-a-Tete (T@T) system
implements shopping agents that
embody a user’s preferences over a
number of attributes such as price,
warranty, color, and so on. These
agents then negotiate transactions
with seller agents on the user’s behalf.
A deal closes when both agents are
satisfied.
While T@T implements complex
value trade-offs, other, simpler agentlike interfaces exist for the popular
online auctions. For example, OnSale
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System of the Bimonth
An interesting agent-based online auction is the AuctionBot at http://auction.eecs.umich.edu. AuctionBot is a multipurpose Internet auction server
developed at the University of Michigan. Use the AuctionBot to create automated Internet auctions according to your specifications, or bid in existing
AuctionBot auctions. Check it out!
Web addresses for other online auction sites discussed in this column can be found at:

on the

eBay • www.ebay.com
eCo • www.commerce.net/projects/
currentprojects/eco/
Moai Technologies • www.moai.com
OnSale Inc. • www.OnSale.com
Tete-a-Tete • ecommerce.media.mit.edu/tete-a-tete/
UMDL • www.si.umich.edu/UMDL/

eb

Web addresses concerning bidding for search-list position are
AltaVista • www.doubleclick.net/advertisers/altavista/why.htm
GoTo.com • www.goto.com/d/about/advertisers/

has a proxy agent called BidWatcher
that automatically bids on the user’s
behalf. The user tells it the maximum
price he or she is willing to pay, and
BidWatcher bids the minimum price
possible to win the auction without
exceeding the user’s maximum.
Similar interfaces exist for other
online auctions.
As online auctions gain popularity
and transition from purely recreational pursuits to more mission-critical
functions, we should expect to see
smarter, more complex user agents.
A “Fair and Secure” Site
Online auctions must be both fair
and secure. They should not let users
or agents manipulate the auction to
their own or anyone else’s advantage.
They should preserve the participants’
confidentiality and ensure that all
transactions are private and completed successfully. Also, they should
enable low overhead by limiting both
added cost per transaction and additional procedural complexity.
Businesses can set up their own
auctions using software such as Moai’s
LiveExchange Auction Server, which
manages auctions among designated
bidders. LiveExchange 2.2 can imple104
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ment most of the major auction formats, such as English and Dutch, and
augments these with features such as
close-time bidding (to allow lastminute bidding) and reserve pricing.
CyberCash is used for credit card validation and SSL (Secure Sockets
Layer) for secure connections.
Emergent Standards
For agents to participate in online
auctions, relevant protocols should be
well defined, probably based on
speech acts, and should be supported
by agent communication languages
such as KQML and FIPA’s ACL.
Adopting a language with precise
semantics will make it easier for
agents to communicate without misunderstandings. A communication
standard will also foster expansion of
agent-based commerce.
Currently, there is a lot of interest
in the XML standard. While XML
does not provide electronic commerce
tags or other semantics, several companies and industrial consortiums,
such as eCo, have proposed competing XML-based commerce protocols.
It is not yet clear which protocols
will become accepted standards.
Agent communication languages have

strong semantics and will likely lead
to more robust agent systems.
However, timing and market forces
may make a simpler, XML-based
electronic commerce protocol the de
facto standard.
Open Market on
Information
Auctions can be used not only for
goods and services but also for information. Consider, for example, a system developed as part of the
University of Michigan’s Digital
Library effort. 1 The UMDL implements an open market in which
information providers, such as publishers, can sell their goods to individual consumers. The system is composed of collection interface agents
(CIAs), user interface agents (UIAs),
mediators, and facilitators. CIAs provide an interface between the publishers’ databases and the UMDL. UIAs
provide an interface between a user,
or a user’s browser, and the UMDL.
Mediators match buyers with sellers,
while facilitators handle the economic
infrastructure.
Almost all UMDL transactions
have an associated dollar value and are
facilitated by auction agents. For
example, when a user issues a query,
his UIA first finds an auction agent
that is advertising the correct type of
mediator agents—those that can
answer the query. The UIA bids in
this auction for mediator service.
Once the auction clears, the query is
sent to the winning mediator for processing. The mediator in turn might
also use an auction to find the services
it needs. Once suitable documents are
identified in particular collections, the
CIAs responsible for them are paid,
using some third-party payment
mechanism, and the documents are
sent to the UIA, which forwards them
to the user.
The UMDL implements, in its
own microcosm, a working model of
the envisioned worldwide electronic
commerce infrastructure. It showcases
both the power and the drawbacks of
using automated auctions. Research
results1 show that these auctions serve
as effective load balancers. For example, when one agent crashes or bogs
down from a heavy load, the flow of
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queries is automatically directed
toward underemployed agents,
because they can offer lower prices.
On the other hand, the use of auctions adds an extra layer of overhead
to the system, which sometimes
increases response time.
The “Invisible Hand” in an
Agent Economy
If we are going to have online auctions
with agents buying and selling items
automatically, we should first stop and
think about such a system’s dynamics.
In a market system populated by
rational humans, Adam Smith’s
“Invisible Hand” tells us that the price
of goods will approach their marginal
costs.2 However, the Invisible Hand
refers only to traditional markets as
defined by economists. In such markets, each product of a given type is
indistinguishable from others of the
same type, there is a sufficient number
of parties involved, and the parties act
to maximize profit.
In an economy of agents, some of
the necessary conditions for a competitive market may not be met, and
prices will not reach the equilibrium
point. For example, a buyer agent
may be unable to reliably assess the
quality of a purchased service, as
Vidal and Durfee indicated in relation to the UMDL. 3 Sellers take
advantage of this scenario by providing lower quality services. More complex buyers might then retaliate by
modeling the sellers’ behaviors. Sellers
might in turn build models of the
buyers’ models of the sellers’ models,
and so on. This situation leads to an
escalation of modeling levels and to
price dynamics not seen in human
auctions.
Another possibility is building
agents with myopic decision functions that maximize only the agents’
immediate payoff. Kephart et al. 4
studied such a scenario and found
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that these systems could lead to continual price wars. Rather than settling
on an equilibrium price, the agents
would underbid each other until the
price became too low, at which point
they would start the price war again
but at a higher price.
These examples warn us that the
price dynamics of market systems
composed of software agents will not
always be the same as those of market
systems composed of human agents.
We must be careful when choosing
the auction types, protocols, and
agents that will populate the future
■
online auction landscape.
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